In a recent conversation with Thomas Burnett on Templeton Ideas, philosopher David Bentley Hart presented his views about the fundamental nature of reality. After saying that reality cannot be reduced entirely to matter, nor is it best understood in dualist terms—i.e., some things are mind, other things are matter—Hart argues that mind is the ultimate reality, in which “all things live, and move, and have their being.”
I’m not convinced by Hart’s claim for a purely mind-based reality. But I agree with his criticisms of reductive materialism and mind-matter dualism.
Hart rightly describes how contemporary science has come to be thought of as supporting reductive materialism. By “reductive materialism,” I mean the claim that only matter fundamentally exists. Reductive materialism says all mental states and properties are identical to physical states and properties of the brain. This implies that ideas, experiences, mentality, and abstractions are illusory. And this extends beyond humans. Or as JJC Smart put it,
“There is nothing in the world except increasingly complex arrangements of physical constituents.”
On the plus side, making scientific observations about the world leads to taking the material world seriously. I celebrate this. But because scientific observations cannot conclusively verify any immaterial dimensions of life, some are tempted to claim that fundamental reality is purely material. Nothing more. I disagree with that claim, as it results from specious logic and a certain degree of hubris.
For example, imagine a successful fisherman who boasts, “Anything that I can’t catch with my nets does not exist.” That’s patently false, but it employs the same logical structure as “whatever science cannot measure does not exist.” This claim is itself empirically unverifiable—more akin to a profession of faith than a “scientific” conclusion.
But the weakness of reductive materialism doesn’t compel us to adopt mind-matter dualism either. The dualist perspective rightly accounts for the subjective dimensions of our experience. So that’s a plus. But most versions of dualism still concede that nature is comprised mostly of entities that are entirely material. This is clearest in discussions of mind-body dualism in humans, wherein the human mind is immaterial, but the members of the body are thought to be strictly physical. And so is the rest of the universe. Like most philosophers, I don’t think such dualism accounts well for how the mind and body interact. And I know of no good theory for how mind emerges in evolutionary history from mindless matter.
An Alternative to Materialism and Mind-body Dualism
As I see it, what I call “material-mental monism” makes the best sense of fundamental reality. It includes the insights of materialism and the insights of mentality-oriented idealism, like we find in David Bentley Hart. Instead of separating life into entities that are entirely material and those entities that are mental, mental-material monism says each entity and creature has both mental and material dimensions. That includes the simplest of entities and the most complex creatures. It’s monistic, because it says every existing thing is fundamentally like other existing things by having these two dimensions.
John Polkinghorne called the position I’m suggesting “dual-aspect monism.” It also falls under the umbrella of what some call “panpsychism.” I prefer my terminology over others, however, because it clearly identifies materiality and mentality as essential aspects of every entity. Affirming both the material and the mental dimensions of reality more fully accounts for what we encounter as we interact with our world.
A Common Critique
While it makes intuitive sense to say that humans are made up of material and mental dimensions, what about the rest of the universe? Do rocks have minds, too?
That’s a common objection to panpsychist theories of ultimate reality. And it should prompt us to distinguish between animate and inanimate entities, or between what some call organisms and aggregates. Animate organisms have an organizing member that gives them a unified experience. This includes everything from cells to human minds.
Inanimate aggregates like rocks, however, don’t have the unity of experience we find in animate organisms. The individual entities that make up aggregate objects like rocks do have a minuscule measure of mentality. But because they are not unified or organized, the object as a whole is not animated.
Even the most primitive, single-celled microbe has a greater mind than a mountain of rocks.
Distinguishing Hart’s Monism From Mine
Hart and I agree that nothing in this universe, not even rocks, is purely material. And assuming I understand him correctly, we agree that all of reality, even its simplest parts, derive from others with at least a mental dimension. But I doubt Hart would say his position is identical to mine. As I understand him, he’s making the claim that only mind is fundamental. He says a divine and immaterial Mind once existed all alone and then created a universe with material forms. And he says this Mind expresses itself in the material created. As I understand Hart, therefore, matter is contingent and derivative of mind rather than a necessary aspect of what it means for anything to exist.
I propose that all existing entities, at all times, possess both mentality and matter in varying degrees and forms.
The Question of God
Hart says that taking his reasoning to its natural conclusion entails a belief in an Absolute Mind that he equates with God. But I think a person can affirm mental-material monism, as I formulate it, without having to assume the existence of God. Bertrand Russell is an example of an atheist who affirmed something similar to what I’m proposing.
Yet I do believe God exists. And I think mental-material monism is the most parsimonious perspective on offer to account for both the material and mental dimensions of reality. This perspective provides resources that other theories about God and existence do not contain.
For example, let me compare my view of God with a more traditional one. Classical theists have claimed that God is immaterial. Hart’s claim that God is a Mind or mind-like fits this classical perspective.
If God is immaterial, it’s difficult to imagine how a deity who is entirely immaterial interacts with creatures with material dimension. And it’s hard to imagine how mental-material creatures would interact with a wholly immaterial God. Of course, classical theists typically wave off this worry by saying the God who created material creatures in the first place can act causally in relation to them. But it doesn’t answer the how question I’m raising.
I reject the classic view that God is entirely immaterial. I think God has mental and material dimensions. This isn’t a provable claim, I admit, but saying God is immaterial isn’t provable either. Besides, I think a good case can be made from scripture, especially how the Apostle Paul talks about God as pneuma. It makes conceptual sense to say a deity with material and mental dimensions interacts with creatures with material and mental dimensions. No great leaps of imagination are required.
Divine Hiddenness
But I can imagine someone asking, “But if God has a material dimension, why can’t we see God at work in the world?”
That’s an important question. I’d respond by making several points. First, there are many elements of our reality that we can’t see, and yet we think have material dimensions. Some of the elements on the periodic table, like noble gases, are not visible to the human eye. Or take dark matter and dark energy. They haven’t been directly observed, but they are estimated to comprise most of the universe.
Second, if we think humans (and other creatures) have minds that interact with our brains and bodies, we’re positing entities with causal influence that we cannot see. You can’t crack open someone’s skull and see her mind flitting about. Analogously, a divine mind causally influences the universe and yet cannot be perceived with our five senses.
What I’m saying is that theists like me can keep our claims that God is invisible and universal, while also saying God has mental and material dimensions. These ideas are compatible.
A Re-enchanted Universe
Like other forms of panpsychism, mental-material monism supports a view of enchanted, experiential existence. (For more on this, see Philip Goff’s recent book, Why?) In fact, I think it offers the best overall framework for taking ecology and the climate change crisis seriously.
Our intuition to care for creation and its creatures has a firm footing if we think the entities of existence have the mentality required to experience joy and pain. And because creatures also have a material dimension, the causal activity that generates ecological harm and health makes sense. But others have also written on this issue from a material-mental monism perspective. (For instance, see Joanna Leidenhag’s book Minding Creation.)
Even if we cannot empirically confirm which view of fundamental reality is the most accurate, we are not logically compelled to adopt a purely materialistic view of reality either. We should not confuse intellectual fashion with the ways we inevitably live. Instead, let us take inspiration from one of the world’s great visionaries, William Shakespeare, through the character of Hamlet:
“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dream of in your philosophy.”
Thomas Jay Oord is a theologian, philosopher, and scholar of multi-disciplinary studies. He teaches doctoral students at Northwind Theological Seminary and directs the Center for Open and Relational Theology. Oord is known for his writings on love and the problem of evil, which prompt ontological questions about the fundamental aspects of existence.
